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ABSTRACT 
Today’s resource boom in Africa, driven by Asian economic growth, offers new opportunities for 
resource-rich African countries. Contrary to the experience of previous booms, however, most mining 
profits now accrue to foreign companies, leaving little room for governments to use revenues for pro-poor 
investments or to mitigate adverse distributional impacts. Taking Zambia as a case study, this paper 
shows that despite privatization, Dutch disease remains a valid concern and may hamper economic 
diversification, worsen income distribution, and undermine poverty reduction strategies. Mining royalties 
must, therefore, be increased and used to finance growth-inducing investments that encourage pro-poor 
economic diversification, else many African countries will remain caught in a resource trap. 
Keywords: Dutch disease, resource booms, privatization, income distribution, Africa, Zambia  1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Asian growth and the rise of China and India have led to significant changes in the structure of global 
trade and capital markets. Primary commodity prices have reached new highs, labor-intensive 
manufacturing is increasingly competitive, and Asia is a more important source of foreign direct 
investment. These changes in the world economy are occurring at a time when the deadline for the 
Millennium Development Goals is rapidly approaching and developing countries have been responding 
with national strategies drafted to achieve poverty-reducing growth. These economic changes are 
particularly important for Sub-Saharan Africa, which remains the world’s poorest region, characterized by 
long-term divergence from economic trends in other developing regions. Many African countries rely on 
primary exports, yet their terms-of-trade have worsened over the last three decades (UNCTAD 2005a). 
By reversing the decline in commodity prices, Asia’s expansion could signal new opportunities for 
economic growth in Africa. Indeed, resource-rich African countries have benefited from high commodity 
prices and accelerated economic growth from new mining investments (Goldstein et al. 2006; World 
Bank 2006a). What is uncertain, however, is whether the current resource boom will encourage 
sustainable and poverty-reducing growth in Africa. 
Debate continues over the economic benefits of mineral and oil resources.
1 Traditional arguments 
suggest that resource booms limit structural diversification and technology accumulation, and generate 
rent-seeking and corruption that undermine effective spending of windfall gains (Gelb et al. 1988; Auty 
1990). This is the well-known “Dutch disease” that has occurred in countries like Nigeria and Zambia, 
which have so far failed to translate resource abundance into equitable and sustainable growth. From this 
perspective, the current boom will be a curse for development as it will keep African countries locked in a 
resource-based development trap. An opposing view sees mining-led growth as one of the few 
opportunities that low-income African countries have to catch up with countries in other regions (Collier 
2006; Page 2006; Goldstein et al. 2006). Historical evidence supports this counterclaim as well. Countries 
like Chile and Indonesia have demonstrated that mining-led growth can lead to more diversified economic 
growth if governments maintain macroeconomic stability and use the returns from natural resources to 
make appropriate investments (Temple 2003). From this more optimistic perspective, the current resource 
boom could help finance the investments needed to push Africa out of its development trap.  
Many of the arguments surrounding resource booms and mining-led growth were informed by 
pre-structural adjustment conditions in Africa, when mines were state-owned and their profits (or losses) 
greatly influenced government revenues. However, privatization and the subsequent foreign ownership of 
                                                      
1 While Sachs and Warner (1999, 2001) find that countries with high resource-exports-to-GDP ratios experience lower 
growth rates, other research shows that resource abundance has a neutral or even positive effect on growth (Davis 1995; 
Lederman and Maloney 2003;  Ding and Field 2005).   2
African mining could reduce some of the negative consequences of resource booms. Because mining 
profits are now remitted abroad, their negative exchange rate effects are offset. Conversely, difficulties in 
taxing foreign mining companies may prevent governments from turning natural resources into public 
investments that can offset the negative consequences of Dutch disease.  
In this paper we consider the impact of resource booms on Africa, paying particular attention to 
how privatization may have altered the transmission channels determining the economic outcomes from 
resource booms. We first review the effects of the current boom and examine how the relationship 
between the mining and public sectors has been altered by privatization. We then use Zambia as a case 
study and develop a simple economywide model to examine the impact of the resource boom on 
economic structure and income distribution. We find that while privatization has significantly altered the 
effects of the resource boom on household incomes and government revenues, the boom still exacerbates 
resource competition and worsens diversification and income inequality. Thus, despite a positive growth-
effect, the threat of Dutch disease remains, although its effects are less severe than they were before 
privatization. We also find that raising mining taxes from current low levels will provide African 
countries much needed revenues, but may exacerbate the negative effects of Dutch disease. African 
governments therefore find themselves caught in an increasingly challenging situation: to turn the current 
resource boom into an opportunity for accelerated economic development they must raise taxes to finance 
public spending, but in doing so they risk worsening its negative consequences.    3
2.  THE CURRENT RESOURCE BOOM AND MINING-LED GROWTH IN AFRICA 
Economic growth has recently accelerated in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa grew at 2.4 percent during 1990-
2002, but this rate doubled to 4.8 percent during 2002-05 (World Bank 2007). Half of this additional 
growth has been generated by mining and construction, whose annual growth rate increased from 1.8 
percent to 8.1 percent. New mining growth has been driven by both a rise in world commodity prices and 
an expansion of foreign investment in the mining sector. In this section we examine both dimensions of 
the current resource boom and suggest that they may signal the beginning of a prolonged period of 
mining-led growth in Africa. We then consider how the fiscal implications of resource booms have been 
changed by the privatization of state-owned mines. These changes put into question whether concerns 
over Dutch disease and traditional policy prescriptions still apply to Africa today. 
Rising Commodity Prices and Appreciating Exchange Rates 
The resource boom that started in Africa in 2002 has been both rapid and pronounced. Commodity prices 
surged during 2002-06 due to strong global economic growth (see Figure 1). Much of the upward 
pressure on prices has been driven by Asia, with China alone accounting for half of the increase in world 
demand for aluminum, copper, and steel (IMF 2006a). This is a new peak period for metals and oil prices, 
both of which have doubled since 2000. Copper prices have risen particularly fast, tripling in less than 
five years from their lowest to their highest levels since the early 1970s. However, while metal and oil 
prices have risen sharply, agricultural and food prices have stagnated or only risen modestly. Most 
African countries still depend on primary exports and about 45 percent of Africa’s population lives in 
mineral-based economies (Diao et al. 2007). As a result, the effects of the mineral price boom have been 
concentrated in Africa, where terms-of-trade improved by 30 percent during 1999-2004 compared with 8 
percent for Latin America (UNCTAD 2005a). These regional differences arise not only due to higher 
primary commodity prices, but also due to a decline in manufacturing prices (caused primarily by rising 
Chinese manufacturing exports). Accordingly, resource-poor exporters of manufactured goods in East and 
South Asia have seen an 11 percent decline in their terms-of-trade over the same period.    4











































   
Source: Authors’ calculations using World Bank (2007) and IMF (2007a). 
Notes: Dollar-denominated commodity prices deflated by United States producer price index. The composite metals price index 
mirrors that of copper, while the raw agriculture index has remained constant since the 1980s. 
Rising mineral prices raise concerns about “Dutch disease,” which refers to booming mining 
exports driving down non-mining exports, thus reducing export diversity and, possibly, long-run 
economic growth. This structural change arises because an appreciation of the real exchange rate resulting 
from higher prices for mining exports lowers the competitiveness of agricultural and manufacturing 
exports and draws resources away from non-mining export sectors towards non-traded goods and 
services. We can see this effect taking place after the recent resource boom. Mining exports from Sub-
Saharan Africa have responded positively to improved mineral prices, more than doubling in real terms 
during 2000-03 (World Bank 2006a). These mining exports have in turn affected exchange rates. There is 
a strong correlation between recent changes in real exchange rates and the export orientation of African 
countries (see Figure 2). The real exchange rates of mineral and oil exporting countries appreciated during 
2000-05, with Equatorial Guinea and Zambia appreciating the most. Conversely, countries with greater 
dependence on agricultural exports - such as Malawi, Rwanda, and Tanzania - experienced depreciations 
of their real exchange rates. This is consistent with the slower growth of world agricultural prices. 
Exporters of both mining and agricultural goods, such as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, have seen slight 
appreciations. These exchange rate movements suggest that mining exports could threaten non-mining 
production in mineral- and oil-based African economies. Furthermore, assuming non-mining traded goods 
have stronger “learning-by-doing” effects, mining growth might also result in economywide productivity 
losses that further reduce growth (Torvik 2001).   5
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Source: Authors’ calculations using World Bank (2007) and IMF (2007a). 
Notes: Mineral- and oil-based countries shown in bold as classified by UNIDO (2004). Remaining low-income African countries 
excluded due to lack of data on real exchange rate movements. 
Commodity prices are expected to fall from their current peaks. Resource booms during the early 
1970s and late 1980s were followed by increased mining production and decelerations in world demand, 
with resulting declines in world prices (see Figure 1). Therefore, while metal and oil prices have reached 
new highs, supply-side adjustments, such as the catch-up of delayed investments and the easing of 
technical and energy constraints, should cause prices to fall (World Bank 2006b). However, historical 
evidence also suggests that the income elasticity for metals is high, and that demand for metals typically 
grows in parallel with average per capita incomes until the latter reach about $15,000-$20,000 (adjusted 
for purchasing power) (IMF 2006a). This is significantly higher than current per capita incomes in China 
and India. Thus, while price volatility will probably remain (Goldstein et al. 2006), it is reasonable to 
expect mining demand to increase further over the medium term. The current resource boom may 
therefore signal the beginning of a longer period of mining-led growth in many African countries, 
especially if high prices and demand continue to attract new foreign investments in the mining sector. 
Expanding Foreign Investment in African Mining 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Africa have also risen rapidly since 2002. FDI doubled during 
2004-05 alone, reaching the historic high of US$31 billion. This is equivalent to 15 percent of the 
region’s total export earnings (UNCTAD 2006). The composition of FDI has also changed dramatically. 
Until 2000, Britain, France, Germany and the United States accounted for more than 70 percent of total   6
inflows. Recently, China, India, and South Africa have played a more important role, significantly 
contributing to the recent spike in FDI (UNCTAD 2005b). The sectoral composition of FDI has also 
become more concentrated in the mining sector. Foreign investment in Africa still focuses on primary 
sectors, but until 2000 it was balanced between agriculture and mining (see Table 1). Since 2000 almost 
three-quarters of FDI has been directed towards the mining sector. Mining investments grew by 22 
percent during 2000-04, a rate more than twice that of the previous five years. Although oil sector 
investments still dominate the share of FDI, the mineral sector’s share of FDI has grown more rapidly. By 
contrast, FDI to agriculture has decelerated during this period and the top ten FDI recipients in Africa are 
now mineral- and oil-based countries (UNCTAD 2005b). Thus, not only have rising world mineral prices 
affected African exports and exchange rates, but they have also attracted large foreign investments into 
the mining sector. 
Table 1. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into low-income Sub-Saharan Africa  
  Change in FDI inflows (%)    Share of FDI inflows (%) 
  1995-2000  2000-04   2000 2004 
Low-income Sub-Saharan Africa  8.9  15.4   100.0 100.0 
Agricultural sector  9.2  4.2   42.8 28.5 
Oil and mineral sector  8.7  22.0   57.2 71.5 
   Oil  8.5  20.4   52.8 62.7 
   Mineral  11.1 37.1   4.4 8.8 
Source: World Bank (2007) and UNCTAD (2005b). 
FDI inflows include both the purchase of existing mines and “green field“ investments in new 
mining ventures, reflecting the influence of new Asian companies as well as an expansion of current 
production capacities (UNCTAD 2005b). As with the rise of world mineral prices, the impact of a surge 
in mining investment is not clearly discernible. FDI inflows are usually associated with positive 
externalities, including technological spillovers, human capital formation from learning-by-doing, and 
crowding-in of domestic investments (Markusen and Venables 1999; Torvik 2001). However, there is 
consensus in the literature that the enclave structure of the mining sector limits these positive externalities 
(Auty 1993; Emerson 1982). Technology spillovers are undermined by the weak linkages of the mining 
sector to the rest of the economy, and learning-by-doing is constrained by the low labor-intensity of 
mining production. FDI inflows might also exacerbate the real appreciation of African exchange rates, at 
least in the short run. Thus, while FDI and rising world prices may encourage mining expansion, their 
overall impact on economic growth and poverty reduction depends on the sector’s economywide growth 
linkages and on the externalities it generates for the non-mining sectors.    7
Remitted Mining Profits and Low Mining Taxes 
Evidence from outside Africa shows how government revenues from mining royalties and taxes can 
finance the investments needed to translate mining booms into broad-based growth. Chile successfully 
transformed itself from a low-income copper-dependent economy into a middle-income country by using 
mining revenues to support structural diversification. Windfall revenues from resource booms during the 
1970s were invested in agricultural export sectors and in upstream resource-based processing. This 
diversification strategy targeted investments in sectors with comparative advantage, and these sectors 
served as drivers of broader-based growth. Investments in education enabled people to participate in an 
increasingly diversified and skill-intensive growth process. Indonesia also used oil windfalls during the 
resource booms of the 1970s and 1980s to pursue a strategy of agriculture-led growth. Oil revenues 
financed investments in rural infrastructure, such as irrigation and roads, as well as in input subsidies for 
fertilizer and pesticides. Together, these investments improved the productivity of traditional crops and 
supported the country’s Green Revolution (Gelb et al. 1988; Auty 1990; Rodrik 2003).
2  
The importance of sound governance and fiscal management in determining the success of 
mining-driven development is also evident from past failures. Nigeria demonstrates how inconsistent 
strategies in combination with Dutch disease and bad governance can lead to a resource curse. The 
government first used oil revenues to finance investments in non-traded sectors, such as transport and 
education, which undermined export diversification and entrenched oil dependence. The government then 
invested in heavy industries, such as steel and petrochemicals, in which Nigeria had little comparative 
advantage (Auty 1990). At the same time it reduced spending on agriculture and targeted it towards large-
scale capital-intensive state farms (Gelb 1988). To date, poor governance and inappropriate strategies in 
Nigeria have undermined broad-based growth and the translation of oil revenues into positive social 
outcomes.
3   
The recommendations emerging from these often-cited case studies is that African governments 
can harness the benefits of the current resource boom if they are able to use mining revenues to invest in 
non-mining tradable sectors and avoid corruption and macroeconomic instability. However, these 
prescriptions reflect pre-privatization conditions. They assume that a resource boom will lead to Dutch 
                                                      
2 Apart from well-directed public investments, Chile and Indonesia maintained macroeconomic stability through exchange 
rate management (to prevent Dutch disease), capital flow controls (Chile), and protectionist trade policies (Indonesia). External 
factors also contributed to Indonesia’s success, such as the timely occurrence of the Asian Green Revolution and a close 
geographic proximity to the emerging Asian tigers (Auty 1990; Gelb et al. 1988).   
3 A large body of evidence confirms the importance of governance during resource booms: (1) resource-deficient countries 
may use resources more efficiently (Auty 1997); (2) booms encourage rent-seeking that reduces allocative efficiency (Robinson 
et al. 2006); (3) governments may fail to accumulate foreign savings that can smooth price fluctuations during downswings (Auty 
1991); (4) the public sector may be stretched during a boom leading to a preference for large-scale capital-intensive investments 
(Auty 1991); (5) windfall revenues often must be spent quickly and are thus determined by pre-shock priorities (Gelb et al. 
1988); and (6) high temporary or permanent windfalls from resource booms can distract governments from investing in human 
capital (Gylafson 2001).   8
disease unless combined with countervailing public investments, and that booms generate additional 
revenues to finance these investments. Such conditions may not be as applicable to Africa today.  
First, many state-owned mines in Africa have been sold to foreign companies. This means that 
much of the proceeds from mining exports will remain outside of the country in which the mining takes 
place. This remittance of profits reduces the demand for local currency, thus diminishing the threat of 
Dutch disease. This threat is further diminished by the low labor intensity of mining production and high 
import intensity of its intermediate and capital inputs. In the extreme case, where the full value of mining 
revenues remains outside the country and where there are no linkages to domestic non-mining sectors, 
there might be no effect on the exchange rate at all. Thus the privatization of state mines and their sale to 
foreign companies make mining even more of an enclave sector, and may significantly reduce the threat 
of Dutch disease.  
Second, in order to attract foreign investment in their privatized mining sectors, African 
governments have often introduced investor-friendly tax systems. Consequently, mining tax rates are low 
in many African countries and the share of mining revenues in government income has declined, despite 
constant or increased production. In Guinea, for example, the contribution of mining revenues to total 
government income decreased from 73.7 percent in 1986 to 18.3 percent in 2004 (IMF 2006b). In Ghana, 
royalty rates declined from 6 to 3 percent of mining revenues during 1975-2006. Royalty rates in mineral-
rich African countries today range between zero and 12 percent, with the lowest rates in Tanzania (0-5 
percent) and Zambia (2 percent) (Otto et al. 2006). In addition, direct taxes on the mining sector (i.e., 
corporate taxes) have been reduced and other taxes, such as mineral duties, import duties, and foreign 
exchange taxes, have been abolished in many countries. At the same time, allowances to enable investors 
to recoup their capital expenditure have increased. Thus, even where mining tax systems are in place, tax 
collection has been limited by waived duties and tax exemptions. The current resource boom may, 
therefore, generate little additional revenue for African governments, thus undermining their ability to 
mitigate its potentially negative effects. As a consequence of low taxes and the current resource boom, 
many African governments are starting to reexamine their mining tax policies (Campell 2006). 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that the current resource boom is indeed 
pronounced and, although world prices may decline, it is likely that growing Asian demand and new 
foreign investments in African mining will sustain high growth rates in the mining sector. There is 
already evidence of real exchange rate appreciation in mineral-rich African economies, justifying 
concerns over Dutch disease. However, experiences from outside the continent suggest that the negative 
impacts of resource booms can be avoided if African governments invest mining revenues appropriately. 
However, privatization has significantly altered the linkages between mining and public sectors. Foreign 
ownership of previously state-owned mines and the remittance of mining profits abroad may eliminate   9
any adverse appreciation of the exchange rate. Concerns over Dutch disease, therefore, may be 
exaggerated in post-privatization Africa. The privatization process in many African countries has also led 
to low mining taxes, which in turn limit the revenues that governments earn during resource booms. Thus, 
if the threat of Dutch disease does prove valid, African governments may not be able to finance the 
countervailing investments recommended by successful countries like Chile and Indonesia.    10
3.  ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE RESOURCE BOOM: 
A ZAMBIAN CASE STUDY  
In this section we take Zambia as a case study in which to examine the impact of the current resource 
boom on economic structure and income distribution. We first describe the country’s basic economic 
structure. We then develop a simple general equilibrium model, which is described briefly below and 
whose equations are provided in the Appendix. We use this model to (1) contrast the impact of rising 
world metal prices under pre- and post-privatization conditions; (2) examine the effects of new foreign 
investments in the mining sectors; and (3) assess the effects of the government raising mining taxes in 
response to the boom.  
Zambia as a Case Study for Mineral-Rich African Countries 
Zambia reflects the conditions and experiences of many mineral-rich African countries. First, Zambia has 
substantial mineral resources and its main export, copper, generates half its export earnings (see Table 2). 
Since 2002, copper has experienced strong price increases, rapid export growth, and high levels of FDI. It 
is expected that, even if copper prices were to fall, new investments would ensure continued export 
growth. Second, after several decades of state-ownership and economic decline, Zambia has privatized its 
copper mines. However, this occurred only after the government offered generous tax incentives to 
foreign companies, such that royalties are only 2 percent of copper revenues (IMF 2007b). Third, during 
the 1990s, when mining production and prices fell to their lowest levels in three decades, Zambia 
demonstrated its potential to diversify into non-mining sectors, especially into agricultural exports 
(Thurlow and Wobst 2006). However, agriculture still accounts for only 12.6 percent of export earnings, 
despite generating 20 percent of GDP. Fourth, two-thirds of Zambia’s population lives in rural areas and 
depends on the agricultural sector for its income. Poverty is also widespread in urban areas. Finally, 
investment and private consumption are more dependent on imported manufactured goods in urban than 
in rural areas, although in both urban and rural areas significant shares of income are spent on food and 
agricultural goods.    11
Table 2. The structure of the Zambian economy, 2002 
  Share of total (%)  Household demand 




penetration  Rural  Urban 
All sectors  100.0 100.0  100.0  13.7  16.6  100.0  100.0 
   Agriculture  20.0  12.6  3.5 9.7 3.9  35.8  20.3 
      Staples & livestock  17.6  1.4  3.1  1.2  4.0  35.8  20.3 
      Export crops  2.4  11.2  0.4  63.3  3.1  0.0  0.0 
   Mining  4.4  49.0 1.5 99.1 4.4  0.0  0.0 
   Manufacturing  19.3  21.2  87.5 8.8 37.8  41.3  50.9 
      Processed foods   10.8  4.8 7.1 5.0 9.3  30.7  37.7 
      Nonfood goods  8.5 16.4 80.4 18.0 51.7 10.5 13.2 
   Other industries  9.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 
   Private services  35.4  17.1  7.5 7.3 4.6  13.9  18.0 
   Public services  11.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8  10.0 
Source. Authors’ calculations using the 2002 Zambia social accounting matrix (SAM).  
Note: Export intensity is the share of domestic production that is exported; and import penetration is the share of domestic 
demand that is supplied by imports. 
Modeling the Impact of Resource Booms 
We develop a simple computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of Zambia to simulate the 
macroeconomic, structural, and distributional impacts of the resource boom. The model is calibrated to a 
2002 social accounting matrix (SAM), which provides detailed information on the demand and supply 
components of ten economic sectors just prior to the resource boom. Agriculture is divided into staples 
and livestock and export crops (e.g. cotton). The industrial sector comprises food processing, light 
industry (e.g. textiles), heavy industry (e.g. machinery), and other industries (e.g. construction). Producers 
employ the four factors of production in the model, under the assumption of constant returns-to-scale and 
profit maximization. All sectors employ skilled and unskilled workers (with different intensities); workers 
are fully employed and migrate between sectors according to producer demand. Agricultural capital and 
land are specific to the two agricultural sectors. Nonagricultural capital is mobile across sectors, with the 
exception of mining capital, which is immobile, earning sector-specific profits. Factor incomes are 
distributed according to the endowments of households, which in turn are separated into expenditure 
quintiles and rural and urban areas. Households use incomes to purchase commodities so as to maximize 
utility. Mining revenues are taxed by the government according to a fixed royalty rate, and the remaining 
revenues are remitted abroad. The government generates additional revenues by levying sales taxes, 
import tariffs, and direct taxes. Recurrent expenditure is a fixed share of government revenues. Most 
goods and services are traded on international markets. We assume that Zambia’s exchange rate adjusts in 
response to terms-of-trade shocks to maintain a fixed current account balance. Finally, private and public   12
savings rates are fixed and combined with foreign inflows to determine the level of investment.
4 This 
static model is used to examine a number of exogenous shocks, including changes in world copper prices, 
foreign mining investment, and government mining tax rates. Changes in the model’s variables after 
imposing these shocks are compared to initial or base values to determine the size and direction of 
impacts.  
Increases in World Commodity Prices Pre- and Post-Privatization  
As discussed in Section 2, the privatization of African mines may have changed the channels through 
which mining-driven terms-of-trade shocks affect government revenues and the rest of the economy. In 
this section we run two scenarios to examine the impact of rising world copper prices on the Zambian 
economy. In the first scenario we assume that all additional mining profits resulting from the increase in 
copper prices accrues to the government (Scenario 1). In the second scenario, the government maintains 
its low mining tax rate of 2 percent, such that almost all mining profits are remitted abroad (Scenario 2). 
Thus, these two scenarios broadly capture pre- and post-privatization conditions. The shock is the same in 
both scenarios: a 150 percent increase in world copper prices. This is similar to the price increase 
observed during 2003-2006 (see Figure 1).  
We first consider price increases under pre-privatization conditions (Scenario 1). Here the model 
replicates a typical Dutch disease scenario resulting from improved terms-of-trade in an enclave export 
sector. The rise in world copper prices causes a substantial increase in the value of mining exports (see 
Table 3). This places pressure on the current account balance, which is held fixed, and causes the real 
exchange rate to appreciate, in this case by almost 20 percent. This appreciation reduces the cost of 
imports, whose share of GDP increases dramatically. Additional mining profits are captured by the 
government, such that mining royalties increase from 0.1 to 18.8 percent of GDP, which is around half of 
all government revenues. These revenues allow the government to increase public investment and 
recurrent expenditures. The latter is seen in the large increase in the share of the government sector in 
national GDP, which also rises dramatically (see Table 4). However, while the mining and public sectors 
benefit from additional profits and revenues, the appreciation of the real exchange rate hurts non-mining 
traded sectors. Agricultural exports and nonfood-related manufacturing are especially hurt by declining 
competitiveness and increased competition from cheaper imported goods. The production of food crops 
and processed foods also declines in real terms due to import competition, despite cheaper imported 
inputs, such as fertilizers.
5 Thus, despite the strong growth-effect of rising metal prices, there is a 
                                                      
4 A mathematical description is provided in the Appendix and the model is available on request from the authors. 
5 See Fynn and Haggblade (2006) for a study of the appreciation’s effects on farm production costs and profits.   13
narrowing of the economy into mining, public services, and other less-traded sectors - a typical outcome 
of a Dutch disease scenario.  
Table 3. Changes in macroeconomic indicators under model scenarios 

















(Scenario 1)  (Scenario 2)  (Scenario 3)  (Scenario 4) 
Per capita GDP (US$)  329  396  336  357  374 
World copper price (index)  1.00  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50 
Real exchange rate (index)  1.00  0.81  0.96  0.91  0.87 
Consumer prices (index)  1.00  0.98  0.99  0.98  0.97 
Government revenue /GDP (%)  20.0  39.9  20.7  21.3  26.2 
   Mining royalties  0.1  18.8  0.5  0.6  5.4 
   Other taxes  20.0  21.1  20.3  20.7  20.8 
Investment/GDP  (%)  24.4  27.1 24.8 26.9 27.4 
   Private savings  1.8  1.1  1.7  1.3  1.1 
   Foreign savings  19.7  20.2  20.1  22.5  22.5 
   Public savings   2.9  5.9  3.0  3.1  3.9 
Exports/GDP  (%)  31.3  53.0 60.0 79.4 77.5 
   Mining  15.4  44.7  45.5  67.2  66.8 
   Non-mining  16.0  8.3  14.5  12.2  10.6 
Imports/GDP  (%)  47.6  69.7 51.3 60.3 64.9 
   Food  4.9  11.6  5.7  7.1  8.5 
   Nonfood  42.8  58.1  45.7  53.3  56.4 
Source: Results from the Zambia CGE model. 
The positive terms-of-trade shock raises real incomes and private consumption (see Table 5). Per 
capita GDP increases substantially from US$329 to US$396, driven mostly by private consumption, 
which increases by 9 percent. However, this aggregate consumption measure hides changes in the 
distribution of incomes. Since urban workers can more readily migrate to new sectors of employment, it is 
urban households that benefit more from new jobs in the mining and public sectors. They also benefit 
from rising wages for skilled labor, which the mining and public sectors use more intensively. Thus, per 
capita expenditures rise for urban households, especially for those in the middle of the income 
distribution, because they have more skilled labor. By contrast, the decline in agriculture, especially in 
exports, hurts rural households because agriculture is an important income source for them. Rural 
households are less able to adapt to structural changes since land is their major asset and it cannot be used   14
to take advantage of nonagricultural employment opportunities. As such, falling import prices drive down 
agricultural prices, which effectively lowers the returns to both land and lower-skilled labor. Because 
urban households are net consumers of food, they benefit more from cheaper imports and domestic goods. 
Ultimately, rising copper prices undermine structural diversification and increase income inequality, 
especially between rural and urban areas.  
Table 4. Changes in production under model scenarios 
















in 2002 (%) 
(Scenario 1)  (Scenario 2)  (Scenario 3)  (Scenario 4) 
All sectors  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   Agriculture  20.0  19.0 20.0 19.4 19.1 
      Staples & livestock  17.6 18.0 17.9 17.7 17.7 
      Export crops  2.4  1.0  2.1  1.7  1.4 
   Mining  4.4  5.1  5.1  7.6  7.6 
   Manufacturing  19.3  14.3  18.6  16.9  15.8 
      Processed foods   10.8 10.2 10.9 10.5 10.4 
      Nonfood goods  8.5  4.0  7.7  6.4  5.5 
   Other industries  9.5  11.3  9.5  9.5  10.0 
   Private services  35.4 31.1 35.2 35.0 33.9 
   Public services  11.5 19.2 11.5 11.6 13.6 
Source: Results from the Zambia CGE model. 
In the second scenario we again consider the impact of increasing world copper prices, although 
we now assume that almost all additional mining profits are remitted abroad. Accordingly, while mining 
royalties increase, they remain substantially below the levels achieved in the previous scenario (see Table 
3). Since the additional foreign inflows generated by higher export revenues are offset by increased 
outflows of mining profits, the increase in copper prices no longer generates a substantial appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. However, the exchange rate effect is not entirely neutralized since remittances 
include only the returns generated on mining profits. While the mining sector is highly capital intensive, 
around 22 percent of the cost of production covers intermediate inputs and labor wages. The former is 
more import intensive and so some of these costs add to the outflows generated by the mining sector. 
However, all labor incomes, comprising around 6 percent of production costs, are likely to remain within 
the country. Thus, even if all mining profits were remitted and intermediate demand was for imports only, 
a small share of mining export earnings would still remain within Zambia and cause a modest 
appreciation of the real exchange rate.    15
The real appreciation again reduces the export competitiveness of agricultural exports, albeit to a 
lesser extent than in Scenario 1 (see Table 4). Food crops and livestock, however, are hurt more in this 
scenario than they are in Scenario 1, because urban incomes and demand no longer grow as rapidly (see 
Table 5). Per capita GDP only increases by 2 percent and household consumption by 0.4 percent, which is 
significantly lower than in the pre-privatization scenario. Much of this slower urban income growth arises 
from slower growth in the public sector, which no longer benefits from higher copper revenues. As a 
result, civil sector employment decreases as does the upward pressure on higher-skilled wages. Thus, 
despite the smaller exchange rate effect in the post-privatization scenario, there is still a significant 
decline in rural incomes at the lower end of the income distribution. Even after privatization, sufficient 
linkages remain between the mining sector and the rest of the economy to potentially undermine 
structural diversification and worsen income inequality. 
Table 5. Changes in household consumption under model scenarios 
















in 2002  
(1000 kwacha) 
(Scenario 1)  (Scenario 2)  (Scenario 3)  (Scenario 4) 
All households  295 9.0 0.4 2.4 4.5 
   Rural households  177 3.1  -0.5 0.2 1.1 
      First quintile   58 -6.4 -3.2 -5.0 -5.9 
      Second quintile  92 -3.9 -2.3 -3.4 -3.8 
      Third quintile  111 -0.1 -1.4 -1.6 -1.3 
      Fourth quintile  227 3.1  -0.5 0.2 1.1 
      Fifth quintile    392 7.0 0.5 2.2 3.8 
   Urban households  492  12.5 1.0 3.8 6.6 
      First quintile   141 9.4 0.2 2.3 4.5 
      Second quintile  206  13.8 1.5 4.6 7.7 
      Third quintile  348  15.0 1.9 5.4 8.6 
      Fourth quintile  483  14.1 1.5 4.7 7.7 
      Fifth quintile    1,226  11.3 0.6 3.0 5.7 
Source: Results from the Zambia CGE model. 
The model does not capture positive externalities arising from technology spillovers. However, 
this may not severely limit the applicability of the findings, because it is not clear if Africa’s enclave 
mining sectors generate substantial spillovers. Africa’s experience with state enterprises has been similar 
to that of Zambia, where state mining operations were plagued by inefficiency and rent-seeking. It is 
reasonable to expect that a return to state ownership will produce similar inefficiencies and   16
macroeconomic instability, which will limit positive externalities. Based on this assumption, the results 
suggest that even under the post-privatization conditions of privatized and foreign-owned mines, the 
threat of Dutch disease remains. Moreover, the current resource boom may not lead to the expansion of 
the urban economy, which in the past has bolstered demand for rural agricultural goods. Consequently, 
rural households are likely to find themselves facing negative consequences similar to those they have 
faced during earlier resource booms.  
Increasing Foreign Mining Investments 
In Scenarios 1 and 2 we only considered an increase in world copper prices. But foreign investments in 
both existing and new mines have increased substantially as well. While the rehabilitation of previously 
state-owned mines will improve the profitability of current mining, investments in new mines should 
generate additional jobs that may offset the negative outcomes of purely price-driven growth. In a third 
scenario we return to post-privatization conditions and impose on the model both the increase in world 
copper prices and an expansion of FDI in Zambia’s mining sector. To capture the effects of new 
investments in the model, we assume that mining capital increases by 50 percent. This is similar to the 
increase in mining FDI for Zambia during 2003-2006.  
Most of the new mining investment in Zambia will generate demand for imported rather than 
domestic goods. This implies that new FDI inflows will broadly be matched by capital outflows from 
imports. Thus, while increasing FDI in the model causes the share of foreign investment in GDP to rise, 
imported capital goods offset this capital inflow (see Table 3). FDI inflows therefore do not directly cause 
real exchange rate appreciation.
6 However, new capital does cause mining production and exports to 
increase substantially, more than it does in Scenario 2.
7 This again places pressure on the current account, 
causing a significant appreciation of the real exchange rate, which undermines the competitiveness of 
non-mining exports and encourages import competition in domestic markets.  
Agriculture and manufacture are hurt by falling competitiveness, especially in the more export-
intensive sectors, where demand for lower-skilled workers declines as a result (see Table 4). The high 
capital intensity of mining production means that it does not generate new jobs sufficient to offset those 
being lost in other sectors. Rising mining production does, however, generate demand for higher-skilled 
workers and average GDP per capita grows by 9 percent, which is substantially higher than in scenarios 
without additional FDI inflows. But urban households again benefit more than rural households (see 
                                                      
6 In the short-run there may be a real exchange rate appreciation if financial inflows precede imported capital goods. 
However, in the long-run these flows offset each other and all effects arise through changes in production and exports. 
7 Scenario 3 is equivalent to Scenario 2 but with the additional impact of increased foreign mining investment. To gauge the 
impact of mining FDI in isolation from price effects, we therefore compare the outcomes of Scenario 3 with those of Scenario 2 
rather than with base values.    17
Table 5). Additional mining growth bolsters urban incomes and consumption, which grow more rapidly 
than in Scenario 2. Average rural incomes also rise, but this hides worsening inequality within rural areas. 
Rural households in the higher income quintiles benefit more from cheaper imported goods and from 
rising high-skilled wages, especially in the rural public sector.  
The results from the model indicate that, despite encouraging economic growth and raising 
average incomes, higher world prices for metals undermine structural diversification and worsen income 
inequality. Privatization has reduced the severity of Dutch disease by limiting the exchange rate effect. 
However, this does not mitigate the negative consequences for lower-income rural households. Thus, 
resource booms in post-privatization Africa generate the same adverse effects on poor rural households, 
but lead to a more limited expansion of the public sector and thus smaller increases in urban incomes. 
Furthermore, while mining tax revenues do increase as a result of increased FDI, African governments are 
constrained in their ability to offset adverse distributional outcomes because they no longer capture a 
significant share of mining profits. It is not surprising that many African governments have begun 
negotiating increases in mining taxes. 
Increasing Mining Taxes 
There is mounting pressure on African governments to raise mining taxes. The previous scenario showed 
how households in Zambia will not benefit as greatly from the current resource boom as they have done 
in the past. This raises political pressure from an influential urban constituency that is only partly offset 
by cheaper imports for urban consumers. Urban constituents may advocate mining taxes as a means of 
financing public-sector wages and employment. In rural areas, agricultural exporters are also adversely 
affected by the resource boom. In Zambia, as elsewhere, agricultural exporters are often foreign 
companies that have taken advantage of improved post-privatization conditions. These large-scale 
producers can also place considerable pressure on the government, especially since poverty reduction in 
Zambia over the last two decades has been driven mostly by export agriculture. Rural constituents may 
favor mining taxes as a means of generating public investments in rural areas or subsidizing agricultural 
inputs. Finally, many development experts are recommending royalty and mining taxes as a means of 
harnessing some of the windfall gains in order to generate poverty-reducing growth (IMF 2006a). In a 
fourth scenario we extend Scenario 3 by including the additional impact of increasing mining royalty 
rates from 2 percent to 15 percent.
8 This is an ad hoc adjustment, broadly similar to mining royalties in 
Asia but higher than in Latin America (Otto et al. 2006). 
                                                      
8 Scenario 4 is same as Scenario 3 except that mining taxes are now increased to 10 percent. To gauge the impact of tax 
increases alone, we compare the results from Scenario 4 with those of Scenario 3 rather than with base values.   18
Raising mining taxes generates model results closer to the pre-privatization scenario. Additional 
mining revenues permit higher public investment and recurrent expenditures (see Table 3). Per capita 
GDP grows by 14 percent, which is only 6 percentage points below the growth generated under pre-
privatization conditions. However, since a larger share of mining profits remains within Zambia, there is 
greater pressure on the real exchange rate, which appreciates further. This reduces the price of imports 
and the competitiveness of both non-mining and mining exports, which decline as a share of GDP. Again, 
export agriculture and manufacturing suffer under a more appreciated real exchange rate (see Table 4). 
There is also greater resource competition, especially for higher-skilled workers in the expanded public 
sector. This drives up skilled wages, thus raising urban incomes and consumption (see Table 5). Higher-
income rural households benefit from higher skilled wages and cheaper imports, while low-income rural 
households consume less because of greater import competition for agricultural goods and falling low-
skilled employment rates and wages.  
The results show that increasing mining taxes raises average incomes, but may worsen income 
inequality. Although we assume in the model that the government uses mining taxes to finance recurrent 
expenditure and public investment, we do not fully capture the positive effects of this investment. While it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the specific policies needed for Zambia to replicate the 
successful growth strategies of countries such as Chile or Indonesia, we do estimate the funds required to 
compensate rural households for the losses they incur as a result of the boom. This depends both on the 
level of available resources and the efficiency of their use. Here the model can provide a rough estimate 
of the required efficiency. First, we calculate the resources needed to compensate households whose 
incomes decline after the resource boom (i.e., the first three rural quintiles, see Table 5). The ratio of the 
value of transfers required to additional mining revenues collected is 0.047. This means that US$47 out of 
every US$1000 of mining royalties collected would have to be transferred to lower-income rural 
households to ensure Pareto neutrality. While this transfer efficiency seems relatively low, it does not 
prevent income inequality from rising. To ensure both Pareto and distributional neutrality, the 
government would require a transfer-to-royalty ratio of 0.695. This high level of efficiency demanded of 
the government reflects the difficulty of ensuring that the current resource boom benefits all sections of 
the population. 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
In reviewing the current resource boom we find that much of the rise in world mineral prices and foreign 
investments in Africa have been driven by Asian growth. This has caused real exchange rates to 
appreciate in mineral-rich African countries, raising concerns about Dutch disease. However, 
privatization has left many of Africa’s previously state-owned mines in the hands of foreign companies, 
implying that mining profits are now more likely to be remitted abroad than added to government 
revenues. In this paper we have examined the impact of the resource boom on a typical resource-rich 
African country. We have asked whether the generous tax incentives offered to foreign mining companies 
have reduced the growth opportunities arising from resource booms, and conversely, whether 
privatization has reduced the negative consequences typically associated with resource booms in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
We developed a simple CGE model of Zambia to contrast the growth and distributional impacts 
of rising world minerals prices before and after privatization. We find that most of the profits from rising 
copper prices now accrue to foreign companies. As such, per capita incomes grow by 2 percent, which is 
significantly below the 20 percent increase that would have been achieved prior to privatization. This is 
largely because urban households no longer benefit from high public-sector employment, which had 
previously been financed by mining tax revenues. By contrast, there is little change in expected outcomes 
for rural households, whose incomes are still undermined by falling agricultural export competitiveness 
and cheaper imported foods, and now also by lower urban demand for domestic agricultural goods.  
New mining FDI raises per capita GDP, but it also reduces structural diversification and income 
equality, without generating substantial additional government revenues. The government has many 
incentives to increase mining taxes. We find, however, that although higher taxes on mining profits raises 
GDP significantly, it further undermines sectoral diversification and income distribution. Thus, while 
African governments should seek additional tax revenues from mining companies, these revenues must be 
directed towards investments that enhance productivity and the competitiveness of non-mineral sectors. 
Tax revenues can also be used to compensate poorer rural households, whose incomes are undermined by 
the resource boom. In the case of Zambia we estimate that 5 percent of mining royalties need to be 
transferred to prevent rural incomes from falling, while larger transfers are needed to mitigate rising 
income inequality.  
The results suggest that privatization has indeed altered the context of resource booms and that it 
raises new challenges for African governments. While private ownership will undoubtedly bolster the 
previously-failing competitiveness of African mining, it will also transfer many of the benefits of resource 
booms into foreign hands. African governments must raise taxes to finance the investments needed to 
mitigate the adverse effects of the resource boom and direct their countries along a path of sustained and 
poverty-reducing growth.  20
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gh   government transfer to household  f rm   remitted income rate 
msg   marginal propensity to save for government  f tf   factor tax rate 
h msh   marginal propensity to save for households  c tm   import tariff rate 
c pwe   export price (foreign currency)  c tq    rate of sales tax 
c pwm   import price (foreign currency)  h ty   personal income tax 
c qg   base-year quantity of government demand 
p
fa δ   CES value-added function share parameter 
for factor f in activity a 
p
a α   efficiency parameter in production function 
p
a θ   value added share of gross output 
q
c α   Armington function shift parameter  ac θ   yield of output c per unit of activity a 
t
c α   CET function shift parameter 
h
hf θ   household factor income share 
i
c β   investment demand share 
p
a ρ        CES production function exponent 
h
ch β   household consumption share 
q
c ρ   Armington function exponent 
p
a δ   CES activity function share parameter 
t
c ρ   CET function exponent 
q
c δ   Armington function share parameter 
c
c δ   share parameter for output aggregation 
function 
t
c δ   CET function share parameter  f QFS   quantity supplied of factor 
CPI   consumer price index  
fa WD  
wage distortion factor for factor f in activity 
a 
FSAV    foreign savings (FCU)  ch QH   quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h 
GADJ   government consumption adjustment factor  c QI   quantity of investment demand for 
commodity 
EXR  exchange rate (LCU  per unit of FCU)  c QM   quantity of imports of commodity 
a PA   activity price (unit gross revenue)  c QQ   quantity of goods supplied to domestic 
market (composite supply) 
c PD   demand price for commodities  a QVA   quantity of (aggregate) value-added 
c PE   export price (domestic currency)  c QX   aggregated quantity of domestic output of 
commodity 
c PM   import price (domestic currency)  a QA   quantity (level) of activity 
c PQ   composite commodity price  c QD   quantity sold domestically of domestic 
output 
a PVA   value-added price (factor income per unit of 
activity)  f WF   average price of factor 
c PX   aggregate producer price for commodity  f YF   income of factor f 
c QE   quantity of exports  YG   government revenue 
fa QF   quantity demanded of factor f from activity a  h YH   household income 
ac PA   Marginal cost of commodity c from activity 
a      22
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